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Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of taxation and redistribution in economies
dominated by Elites with limited state capacity. Within an a simple ag-
gregate framework, we discuss the political economy incentives of Elites
to tax, redistribute and increase state capacity. In particular, the analysis
highlights the role of complementarities or substituabilities in the produc-
tion process between the factors controled by the Elite and other social
groups and shows the existence of natural increasing returns for Elites to
increase state capacity. The paper also discusses how the incentives for
state capacity building are aﬀected by political threats of power shifting.
Key words: Elites, redistribution, political economy, state capacity
building.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists are everyday more convinced that institutions and institutional
change play a crucial role in development. There is rather strong evidence of this,
based on history or on cross-country comparisons - see for instance Amsden
(2001), Vu (2007), Keefer and Knack (1995), Olson et al. (2000), Acemoglu et al.
(2002) or Rodrik et al. (2004). 1 Yet, this literature has mostly focused on the
causality relationship that goes from institutions to development. Even though
it is fully recognized in the literature on institutions and development that in-
stitutions are endogenous to the development process, institutional change is
rarely explicitly taken into account. By contrast, the recent literature on the
∗This paper has been written for the WIDER conference on "Elites and Economic Devel-
opment" held in Helsinki 12-13 June 2009. We thank Elise Brezis, the participants of the
conference and three anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. All errors
remain ours.
1But see also Glaeser et al. (2004) for a contrarian view and Collier (1979), O’Donnell
(1979), Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985), Amsden (2001), Vu (2010) for alternative
historical and case study approaches.
1political economy of development is precisely about endogenizing institutional
change, or, of course, persistence.
Among the various elements that trigger institutional change, an important
one relates to the behavior of elites and their incentives to permit and invest
in such a change (Hossain et al. 1999). A well deﬁned research perspective in
Economic History has focused on this issue (Brezis and Temin (1999), Crouzet
and Brezis (2006), Brezis (2010)). More formally, papers such as Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005, 2006, 2008) tend to concentrate on the change of political
regime - and in particular the switch to democracy or the persistence of elite
control.
Another important part of the recent theoretical development literature is
concerned with economic rather than political institutions. It focuses in particu-
lar on the issue of ’ﬁscal and administrative state capacity’, that is the capacity
of a state to actually ’govern’ the economy through levying taxes and spending
eﬃciently the proceeds on speciﬁc public goods, guaranteeing property rights or
regulating the activity of the private sector. Some theoretical political economy
models rely on this concept of state capacity to represent the behavior of the
elite in extracting rents from the whole economy while at the same time trying
to keep control for political power - see in particular Acemoglu (2006). Empir-
ically, several papers have tried to unbundle the role of economic institutions
in economic development and have implicitly shown the importance of state
capacity for the quality of institutions (see for instance Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), Rodrik et al. (2004), Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2006))..
Somewhat surprisingly, however, few papers tried to go further and to ex-
plore the determinants of state capacity. Two recent exceptions however are
Besley and Persson (2008, 2009). Within a simple but ingenuous analytical
framework, these papers study the incentives of the elite in political control to
invest in various dimensions of state capacity. They show in particular how eco-
nomic development, political stability, or the polarization of society contribute
to more or less investments in ﬁscal and administrative capacity by the group
in political control.
The present piece of work also focuses on the determinants of state capacity
in societies where the elite tries to extract as much rent as it can from the econ-
omy while trying to minimize the probability of losing political power. However,
the emphasis is put here on the structure of the economy where the elite is
operating and its implications for the level of taxation, economic eﬃciency and
state capacity building. Two features prove important from that point of view.
First, it matters whether the economy is ruled by a ’political elite’ without a
direct involvement in economic activity, or whether it is ruled by a ’business
elite’ which has the ability to extract rents but with a direct involvement in
economic activity. Second, it is shown that, the behavior of a ’business elite’
and its incentives to build state capacity depend very much on the extent to
which the productive assets it owns are complements or substitutes of the other
productive factors owned by other groups.2
2As a ﬁrst pass, our analysis assumes that groups are homogeneous. This allows us to
2In particular, our analysis provides a typology of diﬀerent economic struc-
tures with diﬀerent implications for the redistributive behavior of the elite
and its incentives to invest in state capacity. Such distinctions are impor-
tant as it should contribute to a better understanding of why diﬀerent elite-
dominated societies may behave in quite diﬀerent ways. For instance, elite-
dominated economies relying primarily on mineral natural resources are likely
to behave diﬀerently than elite-dominated economies relying on manufactur-
ing exports. Indeed the nature of their productive interdependencies with other
social groups will be diﬀerent, inducing therefore diﬀerent incentives for redis-
tribution and state building capacities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we start with a simple 2-factor
capital-labor model where the elite owns the non-labor factor of production. We
assume that the elite can use an instrument (a tax rate) to extract rents from
the non elite group (i.e. workers). Workers can also work in an informal sector
which escapes taxation. This feature limits therefore the ability of the elite to
extract rents from them either directly, through taxes, or indirectly through
changes in factor prices, for a given level of state capacity. We derive in such a
context the extent of redistribution that the elite can achieve in its own favor.
Fiscal state capacity appears as a key parameter of this simple model. We then
discuss therefore the incentives for state capacity building and show that the
elite intends either to maintain this capacity at a minimum or to expand it at
am a x i m u m .
Section 3 discusses the possibility of political power shifting. Indeed, another
limitation to the predation exerted by the elite comes from the risk to lose power,
especially if it were to reduce too much the welfare of workers in comparison
with what they would be able to secure for themselves if they were in power.
In that case, the elite faces the possibility that the state capacity it built would
be used by the new rulers against them. This reduces the incentives to invest
in state capacity when the full political economy equilibrium is considered.
Section 4 is devoted to the important case where there is separability between
the factor owned by the elite and the others in the aggregate production function
of the economy. The elite can then be considered as purely ’political’ in the
sense that what it decides about taxation of labor has no impact on the return
of its own asset. Such a situation is consistent for instance with an elite that
derives income from the control of natural resources that are exported. This is a
situation commonly observed in many developing countries with non-democratic
regimes.
Section 5 goes beyond the 2-class model and extends the framework to the
case where there is an additional factor that is not owned by the elite in power.
T h i sl e a d st oa3f a c t o r s / 3c l a s s e ss t r u c t u r ew h i c hp r o v i d e sat y p o l o g yo fp l a u -
sible situations observed today in developing countries. Key in that typology
is the degree of substitutability or complementarity between the assets owned
distinguish in a simple way the behavior of those in power (elite groups) from those out of
power. Doing so however abstracts from the important issue of intra-group heterogeneity and
its implications for elite behaviors.
3by the elite and the assets owned by the other classes. More speciﬁcally, the
analysis focuses on whether the asset owned by the elite is a substitute or a
complement to the assets owned by the other classes. In those various situa-
t i o n s ,t h ei n t e n s i t ya n dt h es t r u c t u r eo fp r e d a t i o nb yt h ee l i t et u r n so u tt ob e
diﬀerent. This is also true of the incentives to develop state capacity.
The last section of the paper draws together the various results obtained in
the paper, and concludes with some suggestions for future research.
2 A simple 2-factor/2-class model of elite dom-
ination
2.1 Production structure
The economy comprises two groups of agents. In each group, each member
owns some asset that contributes to production. More speciﬁcally, the elite E
has KE members, each one owning one unit of a speciﬁca s s e tKE. Similarly,
each member of the working class L of size L, owns one unit of labor.
There is one numeraire good produced and consumed under competitive
conditions. This good can be produced in two ways. First, it can be produced
in the formal sector of the economy (that is eventually subject to taxation)
according to a standard neoclassical constant-return-to-scale concave technology
Q = G(KE,L) with KE and L respectively the amount of speciﬁca s s e t so w n e d
by class E and labor L used for production in that sector. This formal sector is
assumed to be competitive so that the gross marginal returns of the productive
factors are simply given by the partial derivatives:G0
E(KE,L) and G0
L(KE,L).
Because of the concavity and homogeneity of the production function, these
marginal returns are decreasing (ie. G00
EE < 0 and G00
LL < 0)a n dKE and L
are complements (ie. G00
EL > 0).
Second, the numeraire good can also be produced by workers in an infor-
mal/subsistence sector that escapes taxation3.W ea s s u m et h a tt h es i z eLinf of
this informal sector is a decreasing function of the after-tax wage w obtained in
the formal economy Linf = Linf(w) with some boundary conditions: Linf(0) = L
and Linf(w)=0for some w. The labor supply to the formal sector writes there-
fore as L = L−Linf(w)=LS(w) with LS(w) an increasing function of w.T h i s
feature of the economy clearly limits the capacity of the elite to extract rents
from workers.
In the sequel, it will be more convenient to use the inverse labor supply
function w = LS−1
(L)=wS(L) with wS(L) an increasing function of L with
wS(0) = 0 and wS(L)=w.
3In general informal sector workers cannot fully evade eﬀective taxation as they may still
be subject to consumption taxes and the inﬂation tax, the extent of which depends on the
composition of their consumption bundle between formal sector and informal-sector goods.
While these elements do introduce some interesting features, what is important for our discus-
sion is simply the fact that individuals in the informal economy are relatively less "taxable"
than individuals working in the formal sector.
42.2 Taxation and distribution
We assume that the elite extracts a rent from the working class through a tax
levied on labor income in the formal sector. More precisely, given τL ∈ [0,1] the
tax rate imposed on workers, we assume that the elite can extract rents from the
formal sector equal to T = φτLG0
LL where φ ∈ [0,1] denotes the redistributive
eﬃciency of the government, or the ’state capacity’ of the economy. As in Ace-
moglu (2006), 1−φ is deﬁned as a ’leakage’ that is taking place in the taxation
system. State capacity is thus the capacity of the government to avoid such a
leakage. Various interpretations of this parameter can be given. It may reﬂect
ﬁrst the ineﬃciency of bureaucrats in charge of levying taxes and chanelling its
proceeds. Second, T can be interpreted as a public good speciﬁc to the elite, in
which case 1−φ may be seen as the ineﬃciency in producing that good. Finally,
1 − φ may also describe the degree of corruption of bureaucrats, although we
do not take into account the corresponding revenues here4.
2.3 Economic equilibrium
The demand for factor KE is simply given by the competitive condition
G0
E(KE,L)=rE (1)
which says that the marginal productivity of asset KE is just the net return, rE,
on that asset. Given that the supply of elite capital is inelastic at KE = KE,
equation (1) gives the unit return to the asset owned by each elite member,
as a function of the number of workers L employed in the formal sector of the
economy. In our framework, it is this dependence (i.e. G00
EL > 0)t h a tm a k e s
the elite a "business elite".




where τL is the rate of taxation of labor, w being the earnings net of taxes.




The solution of (2) gives an allocation L = L(τL) trivially decreasing in
τL. Hence there is a univoque correspondence between the equilibrium level
4Note that we do not explicitly take into account the fact that bureaucrats are workers
who have opted for the formal sector. This is justiﬁed if bureaucratic employment represents
a small proportion of total employment. Another way of deﬁning state capacity would be
via the control the State may have on informal activities, i.e. the function Linf(.) introduced
above. This is the approach followed by Besley and Persson (2007).
5The following assumptions ensure that (2) has a unique interior solution L ∈ [0,L[
G0
L(KE,0) = +∞ , w>G 0
L(KE,L)
5L and the tax rate τL. We shall use extensively that relationship and work
primarily with employment, L, rather than the tax rate τL. This implies some
constraints on L.O fc o u r s e ,τL =1 − wS(L)/G0
L(KE,L) has to be in the
interval [0,1]6, which is equivalent to the equilibrium labor force L satisfying
: G0
L(KE,L) − wS(L) ≥ 0 and L ≥ 0.D e n o t e t h e n b y L0 the solution of
G0
L(KE,L) − wS(L)=0 , namely the equilibrium allocation of labor in the
formal sector when there is no taxation (ie. τL =0 ). The implementable set of




2.4 Behavior of the Elite without power shifting
Assume that the elite wants to maximize the average income of its members.




Taking into account the equilibrium condition (1−τL)G0
L(KE,L)=wS(L),o n e













The ﬁrst term of the maximand reﬂects the "market income" generated by asset
KE in the formal sector of the economy. The second term φR(KE,L) is the
rent that the elite extracts from taxing labor.
The two sources of income for the elite are easily represented in ﬁgure 1.
The ﬁrst quadrant 1a) represents the "market income" G0
E(KE,L)KE of the
elite as a function of L.I t i s i n c r e a s i n g i n L, reﬂecting the complementarity
between the elite’s asset and formal labor L. The second quadrant 1b) shows
the " tax income" R(KE,L) of the elite. It has the typical Laﬀer curve shape.
At L =0(i.e. no tax base) and L = L0 (ie. τL =0and no tax rate), this "rent
income" is equal to zero. It has a maximum at some intermediate level L = Lf.
Obviously at L = L0 the slope R0
L(KE,L 0) is negative.
• Equilibrium taxation by the elite
The equilibrium of the elite-dominated economy is then obtained by maxi-
mizing c WE(L), which is a linear combination of the market or "business" income
o ft h ee l i t ea n dt h et a xi n c o m ef u n c t i o n s .







6Note that we are ruling out the possibility for the elite to subsidize formal labor.
6This condition is equivalent to








where the arguments of the G00
EL and R0
L functions have been dropped for sim-
plicity.
Conversely, when φ ≥ φ0, the optimal formal labor allocation is the solution






This equation provides a solution L(φ) which is a decreasing function of state
capacity φ8.N o t et h a tL(φ) is necessarily larger than the "Laﬀer curve" level Lf
that maximizes the elite tax income R(KE,L).A tt h a tp o i n ti nﬁgure 1b, R0
L is
equal to zero whereas the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (4) is positive. Therefore, the
elite does not beneﬁt from reducing employment so much through such heavy
taxation of labor.
This discussion can be summarized in the following way:
• Assume that the function c WE(L) is well deﬁned and concave in L.T h e n
there exists a threshold value of state capacity φ0 ∈ ]0,1[ such that i) For
φ ≤ φ0, the elite does not tax workers (i.e. τL =0and L = L0); ii)
For φ>φ 0, the elite taxes workers. The optimal value L(φ) (respectively
τL(φ)) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in φ.
The intuition of these results is rather simple and illustrated with the help of
ﬁgure 1. As said, the objective of the elite is a linear combination of its "market
income" and the ’tax income" it can extract from workers. The "market income"
reﬂects the "business" interests of the elite. As seen in ﬁgure 1a) it would
induce the elite to maximize the return on its own asset with a maximum value
of formal labor L0 and zero tax on labor income9. At the same time though,
the elite can also extract rents from workers through taxation. As illustrated
in ﬁgure 1b), this motive would ideally lead to reduce formal employment to
the "Laﬀer curve" maximizing level Lf,. The cost of such a choice however
7To get a well deﬁned maximization problem, we assume that the two elite income functions
G0
E(KE,L)KE and φR(KE,L) are strictly concave in L so that c WE(L) is also strictly concave
in L.T h i si ss a t i s ﬁed when G
000











wS¢0 (L) < 0.













9In eﬀect, it might even be willing to subsidize work in the formal sector, up to certain
limit, if this were possible.
7would be to reduce the return on the elite’s asset. When state capacity is low
-b e l o wφ0− the "rent extraction" motive is not strong enough to induce the
Elite to tax workers. Indeed, the elite would get too little from rent-seeking in
comparison with what it loses on the return of its asset. The optimal tax rate
therefore is zero. When state capacity increases however, rent-seeking becomes
more attractive and the elite combines its two sources of revenues: return on
its asset and rent extraction from the workers class. It picks up a optimal level
L(φ) > Lf that trade-oﬀs the two sources of income.
While intuitive, the result that below a certain threshold φ0, the elite does
not tax workers may appear extreme and unrealistic. Indeed it rests on the im-
plicit assumption that there is zero (negligible) cost to run the state apparatus.
In reality, there is certainly a minimum incompressible amount of ﬁscal rev-
enue that a government needs to assume basic administrative or military state
functions. Then the analysis would have to be amended and should include
a minimal public revenue constraint that needs to be satisﬁe db yt h ee l i t ei n
problem (3). In that case, it is easy to see that for φ ≤ φ0, the elite will pick up
the minimal tax rate on workers compatible with the minimal public revenue
constraint.
• Elite’s Incentives to build state capacity
What are the incentives of the elite in building state capacity in this econ-
omy? One can see that by looking at how the maximized value c WE
E (φ) of the
elite
c WE
E (φ)=MaxL∈[0,L0] c WE(L)
depends on φ.O b v i o u s l y w h e n φ ≤ φ0, the elite does not tax workers and
c WE











L(KE,L(φ))L0 (φ) > 0
T y p i c a l l y ,t h ee l i t ec a n n o tb ew o r s eo ﬀ when state capacity increases since either
it does not tax labor or it does so and its revenue rises with state capacity.
The convexity of the objective function of the elite,c WE
E ,for φ ≥ φ0 can
be explained in the following way. When state capacity increases, the elite is
getting more revenue from the rent it extracts from workers at a given tax
rate. The increase in revenue it gets from an increase in state capacity is in
eﬀect proportional to the proceeds of the tax on labor At the same time,
the elite increases the tax rate. Employment goes down but because optimal
employment always lies in the downward sloping part of the Laﬀer curve in
Figure 1.b, tax revenues increase. Hence the total income of the elite is a
convex function of state capacity. Note that these "natural" increasing returns
to scale in state capacity building are independent from any ﬁxed cost to build
8up ﬁscal infrastructures. It entirely comes from the increased elite incentives to
extract more rent when state capacity increases.
Thinking in terms of state capacity building, the implication of the convexity
property is important. Consider for instan c eas i t u a t i o nw i t ha ni n i t i a ll e v e lo f
state capacity φ and assume that there is a cost for the elite to improve that
level by some increment ∆φ and this cost is proportional to ∆φ, with a marginal
cost equal to α.A ss h o w ni nﬁgure 2a), the convexity of the objective function
implies that there are two strategies in terms of state capacity building. For a
given marginal cost of investment in state capacity, there exists a threshold φ
∗
such that the elite will not have any marginal incentive to build further state
capacity below that threshold, or on the contrary will develop maximum state
capacity (ie. φ + ∆φ =1 ) above that threshold. Of course, the threshold φ
∗is
necessarily above the threshold φ0 below which the elite does not tax labor.
An important dynamic property of this model is that the business elite has
no incentive to build state capacity if it starts from a limited capacity - it would
actually destroy capacity if it could. This can be seen in ﬁgure 2b) which plots
the function c WE
E (φ + ∆φ) − α∆φ. The solution to capacity building is the
maximum between the "no investment" strategy ∆φ =0with payoﬀ c WE
E (φ)
and the "full investment strategy" with payoﬀ c WE
E (1)−α(1−φ). No investment
in state capacity is then preferred by the elite when c WE




E (1)−c W E
E (φ)
1−φ <α . The convexity property of the elite
function c WE
E (φ) ensures that this will be the case when the initial state capacity
value φ is small enough (ie.φ<φ α)10. It is only if some state capacity already
exists (ie. φ ≥ φα) that the Elite may have an incentive to develop it further so
as to maximize the rent it can extract through taxing workers. In other words, it
is the ’rent-seeking motivation’ rather than the ’business motivation’ that leads
the elite to develop state capacity in the present framework.
This conclusion might not hold anymore if the proceeds of the tax could be
used by the elite in a public good that would increase the returns to its asset,
as it would be the case, for instance, with some types of infrastructure. As a
matter of fact, such an assumption is probably needed if the present model is to
ﬁt the case of autocratic developing countries which centered their development
strategies on manufacturing.
3 State capacity under power shifting
So far we assumed that the elite could not lose political control. In reality losing
political power is often one of the major concerns of elite groups. The important
point here is that such event may not be independent from the redistribution
operated by the elite while in power. Also, the consequences of power shifting
for the elite may well depend on the state capacity it would transmit to its




1−φ = α w h i c he x i s t sa ss o o na sc WE
E (1) −
c WE
E (0) <αas assumed in ﬁgure 2.
9successor in power. Hence, beyond the logic of "market revenue" generation and
"rent extraction" considered so far, another determinant of the redistribution
imposed by the elite relates to political control. In this section, we discuss the
implications of this additional motive for equilibrium policie˙ s and state capacity
building.
Consider for instance the possibility for the working Class to revolt and
overthrow the elite. To simplify considerably the analysis and in order to stick
to a simple static framework, consider the following two stage game:
- In stage 1, the elite is in power. It decides about its tax rate on the working
class τL (or alternatively the allocation of labor L in the formal sector) and
commits to that policy for the future, conditionally on revolts by the working
class not being successful with probability π.
- In stage 2, if their revolt succeeds, the working Class takes power and
implements their preferred redistributive policies; otherwise the elite stays in
power and implements the policies chosen in stage 1.
3.1 Equilibrium redistribution under the working class
regime
Before considering the behavior of the elite while in power, we have to ﬁgure
out what will happen in a new regime controlled by the working Class. In
that regime, it is natural to assume that the working class will maximize the
average payoﬀ of its members. As in the elite case, that average payoﬀ is derived
from two sources. First there is a "market income" reﬂecting the labor income
obtained by the working class in the economy. Second, there is the "rent income"
that comes from taxation on the elite’s assets. Following the same logic as in
the previous section with the elite, the working class will choose a redistributive
policy that tradeoﬀs the "market income" motive against the "rent-extraction"
motive. 11The higher the level of state capacity φ inherited from the Elite, the
larger the "rent extraction" motive for the Working Class, and the more it will
actually extract from the elite. The equilibrium outcome under the working
class rule provides therefore equilibrium payoﬀs c WL
L(φ) and c WL
E(φ) respectively
for the working class and the elite, that depend on the level of state capacity φ.
G i v e nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nφ allows the working class to extract more rents from
the elite, it follows naturally that c WL
L(φ) is non-decreasing in φ, while c WL
E(φ)
is non-increasing in φ.
3.2 Elite’s behavior under power shifting
We can consider now the taxation decision of the elite in the ﬁrst stage, when
there is a risk of power shifting.
11Nothe that this argument is based on the assumption that an overthrow of the Elite by
the Working Class does not involve any redistribution of the productive asset KE.I ne ﬀect,
expropriation takes place after the overthrow through a tax on the return to the Elite’s asset.
Such assumptions could be justiﬁed if the asset owned jointly the asset KE and the knowledge
needed to combine it with labor for producing the numeraire good.
103.2.1 Exogenous probability of power shifting
Let us assume as a ﬁrst step that the probability, π, that the elite will stay in












where f WE(L) is the expected value of the elite’s payoﬀ. With probability
π the elite stays in power and gets a payoﬀ derived from its "market income"
G0
E(KE,L)KE and its " rent income" φR (KE,L) extracted from workers.
With probability 1−π however the elite looses power and receives its equilibrium
payoﬀ c WL
E(φ) under political control by the working class.
Clearly, the decision about formal employment (or equivalently labor taxa-
tion) taken by the elite is the same as when the probability of losing power was
ignored. Therefore properties i) and ii) discussed in section 2.4 remain valid.
An important diﬀerence though is for the marginal incentives of the elite to
invest in state capacity building. There is now the possibility for the maximum
payoﬀ of the elite c W
p
E(φ)=MaxL∈[0,L0]f WE(L) to be non increasing in the level
of state capacity φ. Indeed, the ﬁrst part of (5) -which corresponds to c WE
E (φ)
above- is an increasing function of state capacity, whereas the second part,
c WL
E(φ), is decreasing. The net eﬀect of an increase in state capacity depends





E(φ), it follows immediately that whenever the probability
to stay into power π is small enough, the negative channel (through c WL
E(φ))
outweights the positive channel (through c WE
E (φ)). In that case the equilibrium
payoﬀ of the elite c W
p
E(φ) is a decreasing function in state capacity.
Similarly, when φ ≤ φ0 and the elite does not tax workers, c WE
E (φ) is inde-
pendent from φ and the only eﬀect of state capacity goes through the negative
channel (through c WL
E(φ)). In such a case as well, the equilibrium payoﬀ of the
elite c W
p
E(φ) is a decreasing function in state capacity.
T h ei n t u i t i o nb e h i n dt h e s er e s u l t si sq u i t es i m p l e .F i r s t ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
as i g n i ﬁcant probability of losing power, the elite prefers not to invest in state
capacity because it might be used against itself by the working class in case it
seizes power. Second, in the most extreme case where state capacity is already
weak enough so that the elite does not tax labor, building up state capacity
would only serve the working class when in power. Here again the threat of
losing power decreases the elite incentives to invest in state capacity12.
12Besley and Persson (2007) obtain a similar result, although less extreme. In their frame-
work, political instability reduces the incentives to invest in state capacity but does not nec-
essarily reverse them.
113.2.2 Endogenous probability of power shifting
Consider now the case where the probability π of staying in power is endogenous
and depends on the utility of the working class under the elite’s rule. Various
cases may be considered.
• The "resource capacity" case.
A ﬁrst possibility is the fact that the probability π is a decreasing function
of the income of the political challenger - a higher level of income of the working
class allows them to invest more in a successful overthrow (Acemoglu (2006)).
In such a case, the elite is even more radical than in the preceding model without
power shifting. Extracting rents from the working class not only generates some
tax income but also weakens the workers’ capacity to revolt, increasing thereby
the probability of staying in power for the elite. Consequently the optimal tax
rate on the Working class will be larger than without power shifting.
The incentives to invest in state capacity remain however ambiguous. As
in the exogenous power shifting case, a non-zero probability of losing power
reduces the beneﬁts that the elite can draw from increasing state capacity, as
that can be used by the working class if it ever gets into power.
• The "incentives" case
The alternative assumption of π being increasing with the utility of the
working class may also be justiﬁed. For instance, a reasonable speciﬁcation for
π can be given by the following:
π = Π[WL − (c WL
L(φ) − c)] (6)
In that expression, the probability of the elite staying in power depends on
the relative loss for the working class to be under the rule of the elite instead
of being in command of the economy. Π()is an increasing function in [0,1],
WL reﬂects the utility of the working class under the elite domination regime,
c WL
L(φ) is the utility level of the working class when it is in power and c is the
cost of undertaking a revolt to overthrow the current elite.
This speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that the binding constraint on power
shifting for the elite indeed emanates from the "interest" of the working class to
forment a revolution and not from its "resource capacity"to do so13.N o t ea l s o
that, as usual in the literature in political economy, this speciﬁcation abstracts
from issues of group formation, free riding and coordination that exist in political
collective action.
13An alternative speciﬁcation could combine both the "incentives" and "resource capacity"
approaches by assuming that the "incentives" logic starts to matter only when the disposable
income of the working class under the elite regime is larger than a minimum resource cost.
We abstract from this for simplicity.
12The problem of the elite will be again to maximize its expected payoﬀ
WE = πWE +( 1− π)c WL
E(φ)
where π is given by (6) and WE stands as before for the utility of the elite
when in power. In general, the elite can use both redistributive instruments
such as taxes and transfers and repressive instruments used to increase the cost
c of rebellion.
On top of the "business interest" and "rent extraction" motives, the elite may
also want now to increase the probability to stay in power π through two possible
strategies. The ﬁrst one is to increase the utility of the working class WL through
reduced taxation or the provision of speciﬁc transfers. The second strategy is to
increase the cost of rebellion c through investments in violent repression. Both
strategies however are costly as they reduce the amount of income that the elite
can get for itself while in power. The solution for the elite reﬂects then these
diﬀerent tradeoﬀs. In particular, on top of the "business interest" logic, the
"incentives" logic of rebellion adds up a limit to the "rent extraction" logic of
the elite. The optimal elite redistributive policies will be therefore less biased
against the working class than in the situation with exogenous (or no) threat of
power shifting.
At the optimum, the payoﬀ of the elite will have the following form:
c W
p
E(φ)=b π (φ) c WEd
E (φ)+( 1− b π(φ))c WL
E(φ)
It depends on state capacity φ through three channels.The ﬁrst one is the op-
timal utility of the elite while in power c WEd
E (φ) (i.e. choosing optimal policies
under an endogenous threat of rebellion). The second channel is the utility
c WL
E(φ) obtained by the elite under the working class rule. Finally, the last term
is the equilibrium probability b π(φ) to stay in power (given the optimal policies
chosen by the elite).
In terms of the incentives to invest in state capacity, endogenous power shift-
ing generates some ambiguity again. First of all, an increase in state capacity φ
tends to increase c WEd
E (φ) the optimal utility of the elite while in power. This
corresponds to the positive eﬀect of increasing state capacity without power
shifting. Second, an increase in φ reduces the utility c WL
E(φ) of the elite under
the working class rule. This term reﬂects the eﬀect of a non-zero probability for
the elite to lose power - as seen in the preceding case of an exogenous probability.
Finally, an increase in φ reduces also the probability b π(φ) for the elite to stay
into power. As can be seen from (6), an increase in state capacity increases the
utility level c WL
L(φ) that the working class can get while in power. This in turn
stimulates the working class incentives to trigger a rebellion and consequently
reduces the probability π for the elite to keep political control. Making the
probability of staying in power endogenous with the speciﬁcation (6) thus adds
a negative eﬀect of state capacity on the equilibrium value of the elite’s utility.
The conclusion of the analysis of the "incentives" case for endogenous power
shifting is the fact that it unambiguously reduces the incentives for the elite to
tax the working class. It is not only the threat of losing power that is responsible
13for this result - as seen in the preceding sub-section - but also the fact that
this threat depends on the rent the elite extracts from the working class. The
endogeneity of the threat to lose power is also blurring considerably the role
played by state capacity. In particular it adds an additional element of ambiguity
with respect to the incentives for the elite to invest in better tax institutions.
4 The case of a purely political elite
Several of the preceding results are governed by the fact that the elite has some
"business interests" that are complementary to labor. Indeed, while taxing labor,
the elite has to take into account the impact this will have on the return to its
own asset. It is interesting to contrast this case of a ’business elite’ with a
case where this eﬀect is absent, as if the elite were not actually operating in
the economy, but only getting rents, as for instance with the exports of some
natural resource with relatively negligible labor input and extraction costs, as
can be observed in some autocratic African countries and, of course, in several
elite-dominated oil exporting countries14. Such a case may be represented in
the preceding framework by simply assuming separability between labor and
the asset owned by the elite in the production function.
The important point is that the separability between the elite’s assets and
other inputs in the formal sector signiﬁcantly aﬀects the shape of its incentives
to invest in state capacity. To see that and stick to our assumption of constant
returns to scale in production, let us assume that the production function in
the formal sector of the economy takes now the following linear form:
G(KE,L)=KE + bL
Using the same arguments as above, it can be seen that, in the absence of
power shifting risk, the objective of the elite now writes:
MaxL KE + φ.(b − wS(L)).L
The solution of this problem (which essentially is the Laﬀer curve framework)
always yields the Laﬀer curve maximizing level Lf <L 0 which is independent
from state capacity φ - ignoring the indeterminate case where φ =0 .
The maximized value of the objective function of the elite now is
c WE
E (φ)=KE + φ.(b − wS(Lf)).Lf
which is a linear function of the state capacity φ.
With respect to the incentives to invest in state capacity, this feature im-
plies interesting diﬀerences between "business" and " political" elites. Indeed,
assume again a constant marginal cost of expanding state capacity α.T h e na
14Of course, there are also examples where the natural resource that is exported is also
consumed at home, as could be the case for major agricultural resource exporters such as
Argentina or Brazil.
14"political" elite will do nothing if the cost α is higher than its marginal beneﬁt
(b − wS(Lf)).Lf, or it will maximize state capacity if the opposite relationship
holds. In contrast with "business elites", for political elites the incentives to
invest in state capacity do not depend on the current level of state capacity15
5 Introducing three groups: substituability and
complementarities
Obviously, the previous 2-class models are only able to capture some simpliﬁed
features of actual political economy situations. For instance, it does not make
very much sense to consider the case of a political elite facing only a class
of undiﬀerentiated workers. In actual economies rents would more likely to be
extracted from a class of entrepreneurs, or perhaps skilled workers, with possible
changes in the conclusions obtained above. Likewise, in the case of the business
elite some properties derived above may well be speciﬁc to a 2-class model where
the two factors are necessarily complements to each other.
In this section, we discuss the possibility of richer production structures
within 3-class models allowing for possibilities of substituability across factors
of production. As it turns out substituability aﬀect signiﬁcantly the pattern of
redistributive policies and how it interacts with the level of state capacity of the
economy.
Consider therefore the following economy composed of three groups of agents:
elite E, middle class M,a n dw o r k e r sL. Each member of a particular group owns
some asset that contributes to production. More speciﬁcally, the elite E has KE
members, each one owning one unit of a speciﬁca s s e tKE. Similarly each mem-
ber of class M owns one unit of a speciﬁca s s e tKM, the size of class M being
KM. Finally the working class L has size L, each worker owning one unit of
labor.
• Production
Now the numeraire good in the formal sector is produced with a standard
neoclassical constant-return-to-scale concave technology Q = G(KE,K M,L)
using the two assets KE and KM of class E, M,a n dl a b o rL. The gross




L.16 Of special importance now will be the degree of complementarity versus
substituability between the diﬀerent factors. Speciﬁcally we will diﬀerentiate





15This conclusion can be shown to hold also for the case with power shifting when it is
exogenous. With endogenous power shifting however, the conclusions for the Elite incentives
to invest in state capacity remain ambiguous (see Bourguignon and Verdier 2009).
16Unless necessary, the arguments, KE, KM,a n dL of all these functions will be dropped
in what follows.
15Recall ﬁrst that the constant-return-to-scale assumption on G() implies that
the gross marginal returns G0
E, G0
M,a n dG0
L are homogenous of degree zero.














The complementarity/substituability between the three factors leads to some
typology of archetype economies. It is represented in ﬁgure 3).
a) The "full complementarity business elite" economy:
The ﬁrst case corresponds to an economy where the three factors KE,K M
and L are all complements to each other (i.e. G00
EM > 0, G00
EL > 0 and G00
ML >
0).
b) The "complementary business elite" economy:
In that case the elite asset KE is complement to the assets of the other
classes KM and L. However KM and L are substitutes to each other (i.e.G00
ML <
0, G00
EL > 0 and G00
EM > 0).
c) The "substitutive business elite" economy:
In that case the elite asset KE is complement to one factor and substitute
to the other, while the two other factors are complementary to each other. Two
alternative situations may occur. KE may be complement to L and substitute
to KM (i.e.G00
EL > 0 and G00
EM < 0, which implies G00
ML > 0). Or KE may be
complement to KM and substitute to L (i.e.G00
EM > 0 and G00
EL < 0 which also
implies G00
ML > 0)
Note that the case of the pure political rent-seeking elite would correspond
to the situation where the production function is separable in KE on the one
hand and (KM,L) on the other. As this case is not fundamentally diﬀerent from
the analysis above in a 2-class/2-factor setting, it will be ignored here, so that
the analysis that follows ﬁt sb e t t e rt h ec a s eo fa u t o c r a t i cc o u n t r i e sw i t has i z a b l e
manufacturing sector than natural resource exporters.
An illustration of the various situations listed above for a business elite is
provided by the case where the middle class asset is skilled labor whereas the
"working class", L, is endowed with unskilled labor and the elite with physical
capital. Interestingly enough, it turns out that all the three main cases listed
above are extensively used the economic literature.
The "full complementarity" case a) would correspond to assuming something
like a Cobb-Douglas production function as in the empirical endogenous growth
literature - for instance Mankiw et al. (1992). The "complementarity" case b)
would refer to economies where it can be assumed that skilled and unskilled
labor are highly substitutable, both of them being complementary to capital.
16Production functions with a CES function deﬁn e do nt h et w ol a b o ri n p u t s ,
which is itself nested within a Cobb-Douglas function with physical capital as
the other input would correspond to that case - see for instance Caselli and
Coleman (2006). Finally, the "substitutive" case c) would refer to economies
e n d o w e dw i t ht h es o - c a l l e d" c a p i t a l - s k ill complementarity" property - see for
instance Krussell et al. (2000). In that case, a CES production function deﬁned
on capital and unskilled labor is nested into a Cobb-Douglas production function
with skilled labor as the other argument.
A typical case of substitutability that ﬁts case c) is the limit situation when
the assets of the middle class and the elite are strictly identical. This would
typically be the case when the elite is in fact part of the business community
and competes, in some sense, with the other entrepreneurial classes to get a
higher return on its own wealth. Conversely, the "complementarity" cases a)
and b) may correspond to situations when physical capital - owned by the elite
- and human capital - owned by some middle-class - are complementary. Some
pre-democratic developing countries with large GDP shares of manufacturing
and modern services production might fall in that category.
We will now see that the particular economic structures described by cases
a), b), c) have important consequences for the optimal redistributive policies
chosen by the elite and the way policies are aﬀected by increased state capacity
φ.
As before, we assume that the numeraire good can be produced by members
of the middle class M and workers L in an informal/subsistence sector that
escapes taxation. This assumption implies the existence of inverse factor supply
functions for labor L and the middle class asset KM in the formal economy. Let
denote these by w = wS(L) for labor and by rM = rS(KM) for KM. wS(.) and
rS(.) are increasing functions with wS(0) = 0 and rS(0) = 0.
As in section 2, we consider that the elite members can only produce in the
formal sector and therefore that the supply of their asset is perfectly inelastic
at KE.
• Taxation
We allow for income taxation of both the middle class and workers. More
precisely, let τi ∈ [0,1] be the tax rate on the return to the assets owned by class






The demand for each speciﬁcf a c t o ro fg r o u pi ∈ (M,L) is given by the
competitive equilibrium conditions:
(1 − τM)G0
M = rM and (1 − τL)G0
L = w
17As previously, lump-sum taxation of the non elite income is excluded.
17The factor market equilibrium conditions for the middle class and workers write
therefore as18:
(1 − τM)G0
M = rS(KM) and (1 − τL)G0
L = wS(L) (8)
.
The solution of (8) gives the equilibrium allocations KM = KM(τM;τL) and
L = L(τM,τL) with a univoque correspondence between the equilibrium levels
of assets KM and L and the tax rates τM and τL. The equilibrium elite asset
return in the economy is then obtained as rE = G0
E(KE;KM,L).G i v e nas e to f
policies (τM;τL) ∈ [0,1]
2, it is useful to characterize the set A of implementable
allocations of assets such that:
KM = KM(τM;τL) and L = L(τM,τL) for (τM;τL) ∈ [0,1]
2
In terms of the quantities KM,Lthis can be formally described by :
A =
½
(KM,L) | (KM,L) ≥ 0 ; G0
M(KE;KM,L) − rS(KM) ≥ 0 ;
and G0
L(KE;KM,L) − wS(L) ≥ 0
¾
• The problem of the elite
In this section, we concentrate on the situation where there is no threat of





Taking into account the equilibrium conditions (8), one can write the maximiza-














L(KE,K M,L) − wS(L)
¤
L
Two elements are to be noted. First, as before the income of the elite comes
from two sources: the "market income" G0
E(KE,K M,L)KE and the "rent in-
come" φR (KM,L) where R(KM,L) is the tax proceeds on factors L and KM.
Second, the quantities (L,KM) are to be chosen within the set of implementable
allocations A,r e ﬂecting simply the fact that the asset allocation (KM;L) has
to be implementable under a tax policy (τM,τL) ∈ [0,1]
2.
18We make the usual boundary assumptions that ensure that (8) has a unique interior
solution KM ∈ [0,KM[ and L ∈ [0,L[
19The power shifting model analyzed above becomes much more complex in this case because
of the need to model the coalition behavior and then, possibly, the power struggle between
the Middle Class and the Working Class in case the Elite is overthrown.
18A full characterization of the elite problem is diﬃcult20. Still, the role of
substituability and complementarity relationships between the assets of the dif-
ferent classes can be illustrated by looking at the case of economies with weak
state capacity levels (i.e. φ ≈ 0). In these economies, the elite’s incentives for
taxation are purely driven by the "market income" channel G0
E(KE,K M,L)KE,
reﬂecting therefore the importance of the productive interactions between the
diﬀerent factors of production in the economy. Again we may distinguish ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h ed i ﬀerent archetype economies.
• a) The "full complementarity busines elite" economy
In such an economy the marginal return of the elite asset G0
KE is increasing
with respect to the assets of the other two groups which are also complements to
each other. In such a situation, the eliteh a sa" b u s i n e s si n t e r e s t "t os t i m u l a t e
as much as possible the entry of L and KM in the formal sector. This is done
by choosing zero taxes (ie. (τM = τL =0 )on these assets. 21. The intuition is
exactly similar to that of result 1. Indeed it reﬂects again the conﬂict between
the "market income" and the "business" interests of the elite. Given the full
complementarity of the elite’s assets with the assets of the other two groups,
the "market income" of the elite would be maximized with a maximum value
of formal labor L0 and middle class asset K0
M (ie. a zero tax on labor and
middle class income). At the same time though, the elite could also extract
rents from workers and the middle class through taxation. With weak levels of
state capacity (i.e. φ ≈ 0), the "rent extraction" motive is not strong enough
to induce the elite to tax the economy. The elite would get too little from
r e n t - s e e k i n gi nc o m p a r i s o nw i t hw h a ti tl o s e so nt h er e t u r no fi t sa s s e ta n dt h e
optimal tax rates therefore are zero.
• b) The "complementary business elite" economy
In that case, the elite asset KE is complement to the assets of the other
classes KM and L.H o w e v e r KM and L are substitutes to each other. Again,
the direct "business interest" drives the elite to choose no taxation inducing the
maximum levels of L and KM in the formal sector. The substituability between
KM and L creates however a diﬀerence with the full complementarity economy.
Indeed taxing now one factor increases the marginal return of the second factor,
stimulating its entry in the formal sector of the economy.This in turn beneﬁts
elite members as it increases the return of their own assets KE. The downside
of such a policy however is a reduced supply of the taxed factor, which is also
complementary to the elite’s assets. When the complementarity between the
elite assets and the other two factors is relatively balanced, the cost of taxing
20See Bourguignon and Verdier (2009) for a geometric characterization.
21(KM,L) then is (K0
M,L 0), the allocation in the competitive equilibrium with no taxation,












19one factor is not worth paying to stimulate entry of the other factor. In such a
c a s et h ee l i t ec h o o s e sn o tt ot a xt h ee c o n o m y .
When however the elite’s asset is strongly complementary to one factor and
much less so to the other (i.e. a case of "unbalanced complementarity"), then
it is worth for the elite to tax the less complementary factor in order to beneﬁt
from the increased supply of the more complementary one. This situation cor-
responds to an interesting case of factor price manipulation in which the elite
maximizes the returns of its assets, exploiting the substituability that exists
between the other factors in the economy. Importantly, this case of factor price
manipulation occurs, not because one of the assets of the two classes M and
L is a direct substitute to the asset of the "business elite" (as will be the case
for the substitutive business elite" economy, see below) but because these assets
are direct substitute to each other. The elite may then ﬁnd proﬁtable to exploit
this substituability that aﬀects indirectly its own return.
• c) The "substitutive business elite" economy
In the last archetype economy, the "substitutive business elite" economy, the
elite asset KE is substitute to one factor and complement to the other. Note as
well that in such a situation, the two other factors KM and L are necessarily
complements.
To ﬁx ideas consider for instance the case in which the elite asset is a substi-
tute to KM and a complement to L.22. In such a situation, in order to maximize
the return on its assets, the elite would like to have as little as possible of the
substitute factor KM. On the other hand, it would like to have as much as pos-
sible of the complement factor L. Given however the fact that KM and L are
complements, these logics enter in conﬂict. Indeed, taxing the substitute factor
KM leads to a reduction of the labor wage w and therefore to a reduced amount
of the complement labor L in the formal economy. This in turn reduces the
return of the elite asset. The "business interest" motivation induces therefore a
tradeoﬀ for the elite in terms of its taxing policy.
Two cases may then intuitively arise. When the substituability relation-
ship with KM is strong enough (i.e a situation of "strong substituability"), the
strategy to tax that substitute factor is proﬁtable. The elite will then impose a
positive tax rate on that factor and a zero tax rate on the complement factor.
In the extreme, when there is very strong substituability with KM, it may even
be proﬁtable to the elite to impose a truly prohibitive tax on the middle class
M prohibting its entry into the formal sector of the economy (KM =0 ).
Conversely, when the substituability relationship with KM is weak (i.e. a
situation of "weak substituability"), then the strategy to tax the substitute factor
is too costly, given the indirect consequences on the complement factor L.I n
that case, the elite will not tax the substitute factor and again implement a zero
tax regime on both KM and L.
Whether it gives rise to partial or complete taxation of the substituable
factor KM,t h es i t u a t i o no fa" strong substituability" is driven by a motivation
22The other case can be treated analogously.
20for factor price manipulation as found for instance in Acemoglu (2006). Indeed,
the elite has no motive for rent extraction (as φ =0 ). Nevertheless, it is
taxing the substitute factor in order to increase the return of its own factor. In
opposition with the 2-factor model analyzed above, this is a case where the elite
does not tax to extract rents from the other factors of production but in its true
business interest.
Interestingly, even with factor substituability between KE and KM,t h ec a s e
of "weak substituability" reﬂects the importance of multilateral and feedback re-
lationships in a multi-factor world. Indeed, in that case the elite may choose the
no-tax equilibrium, thus refraining from taxing the substitute factor KM. This
is so because KM is also complement to labor L w h i c hi si nt u r nc o m p l e m e n t
t ot h ee l i t ea s s e t sKE. Hence, when these complementarity relationships are
strong enough compared to the substituability eﬀect, it does not pay to the elite
to manipulate factor prices.
• The eﬀects of state capacity on redistributive policies
How is the policy of the elite aﬀected when state capacity φ increases?
Clearly, an increase in φ increases for the elite the weight of the "rent income"
channel R(KM,L) compared to the "market income" channel G0
E(KE,K M,L)KE.
The logic of rent extraction is therefore strenghtened relative to the logic of fac-
tor price manipulation. Again the eﬀects of this on the elite’s incentives to tax
the economy will depend on the underlying production structure.
In an economy where there are strong enough and balanced factor comple-
mentarities (i.e. the previous cases of a"full complementarity business elite",
a" balanced complementary business elite" or a "weakly substitutive business
elite"), the "market income" channel drives the elite to impose low tax rates on
the factors owned by the other classes. An increase in state capacity φ brings
back the elite’s interest in rent extraction and therefore an incentive to impose
some positive tax on at least one of the other classes’ assets. In that case, higher
state capacity leads to the elite to increase taxes on the economy.
In an economy with strong enough factor substituabilities (i.e. for instance
t h ec a s eo fa"strongly substitutive business elite"), then the "market income"
channel drives the elite to manipulate factor prices through its tax instruments.
Indeed the elite will impose a positive tax rate (prohibitive when the direct sub-
stituability with the elite’s assets is strong enough) on the substitute factor and
a zero tax on the other factor. With a larger state capacity φ, the rent extraction
motive kicks in again and the elite is ready to tradeoﬀ a bit less of factor price
manipulation for a bit more of rent extraction.This implies increasing the tax
base for rent extraction on the substitutive factor and to increase tax revenues
on the complement factor. The elite therefore taxes less the substitute factor
and more the complement factor than it would be doing with low state capacity.
Summarizing, the previous discussion suggests that with an increase in state
capacity φ, assets that are complements to the factor owned by the elite are
likely to be more taxed and assets that are substitute likely be less taxed.
216C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have reviewed a rich set of situations reﬂecting the relation-
ships between the structure of political power, the quality of institutions (i.e.
state capacity), the structure of the economy and the level and structure of tax-
ation as decided by elites. As emphasized by Acemoglu (2006), in such setting
two logics confront themselves: the rent extraction motive and the factor price
manipulation motive. Our analysis then suggests one basic conclusion with re-
spect to the role of economic structures: economic complementarities tend to
favor the rent extraction logic, while economic substitutabilities tend to favor
the factor price manipulation logic.
When the economy exhibits wide enough complementarities across factors of
production, state capacity naturally promotes the rent extraction motive, and
an increase in state capacity is likely to induce increased taxes on the economy.
The converse is true when substitutability relationships across factors of pro-
duction give rise to opportunities for factor price manipulation by the elite. This
factor price manipulation may operate directly as in the case of the "substitu-
tive business elite" economy. It may also operate indirectly as in the archetype
"Complement Business elite" economy where the elite’s assets are complement
to the other two factors which are substitute themselves to each other. At
the same time, though, the price manipulation motive can be mitigated by the
other complementarities that exist in the economy and that may feedback on
the return of the elite’s assets.
When substituability relationships are strong enough compared to comple-
mentarities, even with weak state capacity the elite will tend to tax the substitute
factor or the less complementary factor. In that case, stronger state capacity
by promoting again the rent extraction logic at the expense of the factor price
manipulation logic will induce the elite to tax less the "substitutive" factor and
to tax more the "complementary" factor.
Our analysis also discusses the incentives for elites to invest in state capac-
ity and points out the importance of power shifting considerations. Typically
without threat of losing power, elites always have positive incentives to invest
in state capacity and our discussion suggests that there are naturally increasing
returns to scale in such investments. Power shifting considerations however mit-
igate or may even revert those incentives. As a matter of fact, in a world with
political uncertainty, improving state capacity may turn out to be a two-edge
sword. First, as emphasized by Besley and Persson (2008) it allows other groups
to extract more rents on society whenever they get into power. Second, it may
also stimulate those groups to strive more for political power. Both phenomena
reduce the expected return that elites can derive from improving state capacity.
Obviously, our analysis left out a number of important and interesting issues
on the role of elites in the development process. First of all, it must be kept in
mind that the models analyzed in this paper are static. An important extension
therefore would be to cover in more detail the dynamics of the whole economy
and the joint dynamics of factor accumulation and state capacity building.
Another aspect relates to the concept of ﬁscal state capacity. A simple choice
22of representing ﬁscal capacity has been made in this paper so as to facilitate
the analysis. Better micro-foundations of what is state capacity and how it
interacts with the economy remains however an essential item on the research
agenda. Important issues related to bureaucratic eﬃciency, corruption, public
good provisions, law and security could be then usefully analyzed.
Also, we emphasize very much the fact that a change of political power
r e d u c e st h ei n c e n t i v ef o rt h ee l i t et ob u ild state capacity because of the "two-
edge" sword eﬀect that state capacity can be “used against them” if they ﬁnd
themselves out of power. It should be noticed however that this feature may
only apply to speciﬁc dimensions of state capacity. Indeed, state capacity is
multi-faceted and not just about building a tax base. As a matter of fact,
state capacity also involves dimensions such as the establisment of "rule of law"
institutions and the promotion of meritocratic and non patrimonial bureaucracy
that can serve as commitment mechanisms to protect social groups from power
abuse. In that case, investment in such dimensions of state capacity has a
protective beneﬁt that would especially serve those actually out of political
power23.
It is also important to note that our arguments have been simpliﬁed by
focusing only on one type of taxes (assets taxes). Allowing for more types of
taxes would also generate diﬀerent incentives for the elite, especially if there is
intra-elite heterogeneity, a feature that we have not considered.
Certainly, all these extensions must be investigated before establishing em-
pirically testable hypotheses on the behavior of autocratic elites with respect
to state capacity building. The analysis in this paper suggests though several
interesting hypotheses. This is the case for instance for state capacity building
taking place only when some minimum level of capacity is already installed,
the opposition between the purely ’political’ and the ’business’ elite or, more
generally, the idea that the relationship between taxation and state capacity
depends on the productive structure of the economy, and in particular the com-
plementarity or substitutability of the asset owned by the elite and those under
the control of rival groups. Before proceeding along these lines, however, it is
necessary to check whether such conclusions still hold when other possible uses
of state capacity or the taxes it permits to levy are considered.
Adequately amended though, the models analyzed in this paper may help
reﬂect on some policy issues. Political economy models are inherently unable
to deliver policy messages since policies are endogenous. This is not the case of
policies originating from outside the domestic economy, though. For instance,
the present model could be extended to derive implications for the way in which
Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA or aid) is and should be delivered to an
elite-dominated developing country. This could shed some light on issues such
as the role of conditional aid for state capacity building or the relative merits of
project aid versus budget aid in countries with weak institutional environments.
23We thank a referee for pointing out this speciﬁc aspect of state capacity.
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Figure 3: Archetype economies
in a  3-Class Model 
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